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Abstract
Motivated by the Chinese experience, we analyze a semi-open economy where the central
bank has access to international capital markets, but the private sector has not. This
enables the central bank to choose an interest rate different from the international rate.
We examine the optimal policy of the central bank by modelling it as a Ramsey planner
who can choose the level of domestic public debt and of international reserves. The cen-
tral bank can improve savings opportunities of credit-constrained consumers modelled as
in Woodford (1990). We find that in a steady state it is optimal for the central bank to
replicate the open economy, i.e., to issue debt financed by the accumulation of reserves so
that the domestic interest rate equals the foreign rate. When the economy is in transition,
however, a rapidly growing economy has a higher welfare without capital mobility and
the optimal interest rate differs from the international rate. We argue that the domestic
interest rate should be temporarily above the international rate. We also find that capital
controls can still help reach the first best when the planner has more fiscal instruments.
Keywords: Reserve Accumulation; Capital Controls; Ramsey Planner; Credit Con-
straints.
JEL Classification Numbers: E58; F36; F41.
1 Introduction
China has been a key contributor to global imbalances with both a significant current
account surplus and a substantial accumulation of international reserves by the central
bank. Figure 1 shows the increase in both variables in recent years. The parallel evolu-
tion of these two variables illustrates an interesting feature of the Chinese economy. On
the one hand, there are strict restrictions on private capital flows, which characterize a
closed economy. On the other hand, there are substantial net capital outflows, through
the accumulation of international reserves. This hybrid system differs from the usual
open economy or closed economy paradigms and has receive little attention in the litera-
ture. However, to analyze the macroeconomic behavior of the Chinese economy, it seems
fundamental to have a good understanding of this specific structure.
The objective of this paper is to analyze an economy where the central bank has access
to international capital markets, but the private sector has not. We call this situation a
semi-open economy.1 We want to address two main questions in this context. First, what
is the optimal policy of the central bank? For this purpose, we model the central bank
as a Ramsey planner in a closed economy who has access to the international capital
market and we examine optimal policies. The second question is how does the semi-
open economy compare to an open economy? This question is interesting because we
know that an open economy typically produces a higher welfare than a closed economy,
in particular because it allows intertemporal trade. But the semi-open economy also
enables intertemporal trade. Moreover, the semi-open economy allows to choose the real
interest rate, contrarily to the open economy. Thus, an economy with limited capital
mobility may have a higher welfare than an open economy.
In a model where households face a borrowing constraint, we find that the decentral-
ized equilibrium of an open economy may not be socially optimal and a combination of
capital controls and reserve policy may improve welfare. If the planner is not subject to
the same borrowing constraint, it can improve the households’ intertemporal allocation
1Jeanne (2011) also analyzes a semi-open economy, but in a context that gives no role for optimal
policies.
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of resources. When the set of policy instruments is limited, the best way to improve
intertemporal allocation is to manipulate the interest rate, which is equivalent to sub-
sidizing borrowing or saving. But allowing the domestic interest rate to deviate from
the world interest rate requires capital controls. And when capital controls are in place,
intertemporal trade for the aggregate economy can only be achieved by variations in the
level of reserves.
We consider a simple economy with precautionary saving emanating from credit-
constrained consumers. The model is an extension of the endowment economy presented
by Woodford (1990). There are two groups of consumers with endowments fluctuating
periodically. In each period, one of the groups has a low endowment and may not be
able to smooth consumption due to a credit constraint. This may generate precautionary
saving in the period of high endowment. In an open economy this model would imply
excess saving based on several mechanisms proposed in the recent literature on global
imbalances. First, there is precautionary saving as in Mendoza et al. (2009)2 associated
with a demand for liquidity in high revenue periods as in Bacchetta and Benhima (2010).
Second, when credit constraints are tight, there is a lack of domestic assets in the spirit
of Caballero et al. (2008). In a semi-open economy, the central bank may improve the
saving opportunities by providing liquid assets. This can be associated with an increase
in international reserves. In practice, the liquidity provided by a central bank is typically
made of commercial banks reserves and of central bank bonds. Figure 2 shows that in
the Chinese economy there is a close relationship between central bank liquidity and
international reserves.
In the steady state of this economy, however, there is no need to improve the in-
tertemporal allocation if we assume that the discount rate and the growth rate are the
same as in the rest of the world. The reason is that consumers are able to avoid the
constraint when they approach the steady state. Consequently, it is optimal to replicate
the open economy in the steady state, and thus to set the domestic interest rate equal
to the international rate. The optimal amount of international reserves in a semi-open
2Although there is no uncertainty in the Woodford (1990) model, the heterogeneity across consumers
allows to capture a mechanism similar to a more complex Bewley-Ayiagari model.
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economy is then equal to the amount of foreign assets that would prevail in an open
economy. Basically, the central bank provides liquidity and finances it by the accumu-
lation of international reserves. Therefore, as suggested by Song et al. (2010) or Wen
(2011), the central bank may simply serve as intermediary between the private sector and
international capital markets when the economy has limited capital mobility.
Results are different when we consider growing economies that converge to their steady
state. This situation is more relevant in the context of the Chinese economy. In this case,
the open economy is usually not the first best, so that the optimal interest rate differs
from the international interest rate. The reason is that credit constraints are binding
on the convergence path as consumers are not able to smooth their consumption. Thus,
there is an incentive for the planner to relax the credit constraint. However, whether the
domestic interest rate should be higher or lower than the international interest rate is
ambiguous. This is due to the heterogeneity of households and the fact that there are
both lenders and borrowers. On the one hand, there is an incentive to lower the interest
rate for low-endowment consumers who borrow. On the other hand, there is an incentive
to increase the interest rate for high-endowment consumers who save because they will be
constrained in the subsequent period. Furthermore, the optimal interest rate is affected
by the dynamic evolution of the credit constraint tightness. For example, there is an
incentive to temporarily decrease the interest rate when the constraint is temporarily
stronger. Overall, we find that it is optimal to temporarily increase the interest rate in
an economy with characteristics similar to the Chinese economy, namely: i) tight credit
constraints; ii) a strong demand for precautionary saving; iii) sustained growth.
We focus on a planner, the central bank, who has only two instruments: the levels of
domestic public debt and of international reserves. When more instruments are available,
like lump-sum taxes or consumption taxes, we show that the planner can reach a first best
by fully relaxing the credit constraint.3 In these cases, however, precautionary saving by
the private sector disappears and there is no role for reserve accumulation. Nevertheless,
we still find that limited capital mobility gives a higher welfare, and allows to reach the
3Benigno et al. (2011) also find that the credit constraint stops binding when the planner has a tax
on traded or on non-traded goods consumption.
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first best, when the planner can choose consumption taxes. The reason is that modifying
the domestic interest rate can offset the distortionary impact of consumption taxes on
households intertemporal decisions.
Our analysis shares various features with existing literature. In particular, the op-
timal provision of liquidity in the presence of precautionary saving due to borrowing
constraints is a standard result (e.g., see Woodford, 1990, or Aiyagari and McGrattan,
1998). Moreover, the desirability of using the international capital market to provide
domestic liquidity when taxes are distortionary can be found in Holmstrom and Tirole
(2002, 2011).
On the other hand, our perspective differs from the vast literature on international
reserves and on capital flows. Much of the literature on international reserves focuses on
its role as an insurance against aggregate shocks.4 In contrast, the accumulation of re-
serves in our paper arises from the insurance of idiosyncratic shocks.5 Consequently, the
perspective taken in this paper should be seen as complementary to the literature. Ac-
tually, Jeanne and Rancie`re (2011) find that the precautionary motive against aggregate
shocks is not sufficient to explain international reserve accumulation in China.
Our analysis also differs from the recent literature on the optimality of capital controls
or more generally on limits to borrowing (e.g., Korinek, 2010, Jeanne and Korinek, 2011,
Bianchi, 2011, Bianchi and Mendoza, 2010, or Benigno et al., 2010). In that literature, the
justification for limits to capital mobility comes from pecuniary externalities. Typically,
external borrowing affects a relative price, the exchange rate or an asset price, so that the
financial constraint becomes tighter. The private sector does not internalize the effect,
which gives a role for government intervention. In our case, however, the justification
comes simply from the presence of credit constraints in a growing economy. Consumers
4For recent contributions see, for example, Aizenman (2011), Aizenman and Lee (2007), Barnichon
(2009), Durdu et al. (2009), or Obstfeld et al. (2011).
5A similar difference is found in the literature on optimal government debt in contexts where Ricar-
dian equivalence does not hold. When shocks are at the aggregate level, it is optimal for a government
to accumulate assets (e.g., see Aiyagari et al., 2002). In contrast, when there are idiosyncratic shocks in
the private sector, it is optimal for the government to issue debt. Shin (2006) introduces both motives
in a closed economy. It would be interesting to extend such an analysis to a semi-open economy. In
general, we can conjecture that there would be motives for holding international reserves coming both
from aggregate and from idiosyncratic shocks.
4
would be better off in reallocating resources from the future to the present and government
intervention can increase welfare by using its available instruments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model and
the various equilibrium concepts. In Section 3, we analyze the decentralized closed econ-
omy and examine the impact of changing the supply of government bonds. In Section 4,
we examine the Ramsey planner problem with foreign reserves. In Section 5 we examine
the case where the planner can also choose optimally the consumption tax rate. Section
6 concludes.
2 Model
The economy is inhabited by infinitely-lived households who consume every period,
but alternate between low and high endowment periods as in Woodford (1990, section
I). This structure implies that households save in their periods of high endowment and
would like to borrow in their periods with low endowment.6 But the extent of borrowing
can be limited by creditors, which leads to a desire for additional precautionary saving.
Saving is in the form of bonds that we will call liquid assets. There is a gross interest
rate rt on lending and borrowing.
In addition to households there is a Ramsey planner, that we call a central bank, who
can issue liquid assets and hold international reserves. When credit constraints are tight,
the demand for funds by cash-poor households is small. In a closed economy, this limits
the opportunities to save for cash-rich households. In this case the provision of liquid
assets by the central bank may be desirable.
2.1 Households
There are two groups of mass one of households. At time t, a first group of households
receives an endowment Yt, while the second group receives aYt, with 0 ≤ a < 1. At t+ 1,
the first group receives aYt+1 while the second receives Yt+1, and so on. We refer to the
6There are three basic differences with Woodford (1990): i) consumers may be able to borrow; ii)
there is a Ramsey planner; iii) there is no capital stock.
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group with Y as cash-rich households, or depositors, and the group with aY as cash-poor
households, or borrowers. Each household alternates between a cash-rich and a cash-poor
state, and each period there is an equally-sized population of rich and poor.
Households maximize:
∞∑
s=0
βsu(cs) (1)
We denote consumption during the cash-rich period as cD. In this period, households will
typically hold deposits D. These deposits are one-period contracts, either as direct loans
to borrowing cash-poor households or in public debt holdings.7 Consumption during
the cash-poor period is denoted cL. In this period, households borrow L. Consider a
household that is cash-rich at time t and cash-poor at date t+ 1. His budget constraints
at t and t+ 1 are:
Yt − rtLt = τtcDt +Dt+1 (2)
aYt+1 + rt+1Dt+1 = τt+1c
L
t+1 − Lt+2 (3)
The income of the household at date t, which is composed of endowment Yt minus debt
repayments rtLt, is allocated to deposits Dt+1 and consumption c
D
t , including a flat-
rate consumption tax τt − 1 with τt > 0. In the following period, at t + 1, his income
is composed of the return on deposits, rt+1Dt+1, and of aYt+1. This has to pay for
consumption cLt+1 and taxes. Typically the cash-poor household will borrow, so that at
the optimum Lt+2 ≥ 0.
The cash-poor household might face a credit constraint when borrowing at date t+ 1.
Due to standard moral hazard arguments, a fraction 0 ≤ φ < 1 of the endowment is used
as collateral for bond repayments:
rt+2Lt+2 ≤ φYt+2 (4)
The multiplier associated with this constraint is denoted u′(cDt+2)λt+2.
7Alternatively, we could introduce a banking sector that allocates deposits between loans and public
debt.
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Cash-rich households at time t satisfy the following Euler equation:
u′(cDt ) = βrt+1
τt
τt+1
u′(cLt+1) (5)
Similarly, poor households at date t satisfy the following Euler equation:
u′(cLt ) = βrt+1
τt
τt+1
u′(cDt+1) (1 + λt+1) (6)
The intertemporal choice of a cash-poor household is distorted when the credit constraint
is binding, because λt+1 > 0. The following slackness condition has also to be satisfied:
(φYt+1 − rt+1Lt+1)λt+1 = 0 (7)
2.2 Central Bank Policy
The central bank issues domestic liquidity Bt+1 that pays an interest rate rt+1 and
has access to foreign reserves B∗t+1 that yield the world interest rate r
∗. We assume that
the world interest rate is r∗ = 1/β. Private agents cannot buy external bonds directly,
so the domestic interest rate is determined in the domestic bond market. Equilibrium in
this market is:
Bt+1 = Dt+1 − Lt+1 (8)
In the presence of capital controls, only the central bank has access to external liquid-
ity, so it has a monopoly over the supply of liquidity to domestic agents. It can therefore
manipulate the domestic interest rate rt by appropriately setting the supply of liquidity
B. The possibility of accumulating reserves B∗ enables the central bank to change the
domestic liquidity by simply expanding its balance sheet. The central bank can then
match the desired domestic liquidity by accumulating reserves.8
When the central bank policy creates a wedge between rt and r
∗, this generates
8Notice that this institutional framework is well illustrated by Figure 2, where the sum of the central
bank bonds and reserve deposits of commercial banks (B) closely matches the difference between deposits
and credits of commercial banks (D − L) and moves together with international reserves (B∗).
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revenues or losses that have to be financed. In practice, central banks transfer their
revenues and losses to the government. Therefore, there is a fiscal side to central bank
policy. We assume that the changes in central bank revenues affect the consumption tax
τt − 1. Absent government consumption, the aggregate budget constraint of the central
bank and the government is then:
r∗B∗t +Bt+1 + (τt − 1)(cDt + cLt ) = B∗t+1 + rtBt . (9)
In the following, we will consider two cases. First, for the sake of realism, Section 4
assumes that the central bank cannot change the tax rate τt − 1 which is then constant.
This is justified by the fact that, in practice, monetary policy is more flexible than
fiscal policy. The sequence of budget constraints (9), together with the usual no-ponzi
condition, implies that the constant level of the tax rate is then simply set to balance the
net present value of revenues and losses by the central bank:
(τ − 1)
∑
t≥0
cDt + c
L
t
(r∗)t
+ r∗(B∗0 −B0) =
∑
t≥0
(rt − r∗)Bt
(r∗)t
.
Then, Section 5 examines the case where τt is an additional instrument for the Ramsey
planner which can be freely chosen every period. In practice, this would mean that
fiscal policy is highly flexible and that the central bank can coordinate with the fiscal
authority to maximize welfare. In this second case, the planner can supply liquidity
without accumulating reserves if it chooses to finance the bonds B with the consumption
tax.
Notice that the wedge between r and r∗ is akin to a subvention (tax) on deposits
(loans).9 Setting a higher domestic interest rate is therefore equivalent to subsidizing
deposits and taxing loans, while setting a lower interest rate is equivalent to taxing
deposits and subsidizing loans. When setting the domestic interest rate, the central bank
faces a trade-off between depositors and borrowers.
9Indeed, the net asset returns r∗B∗ − rB of the central bank can be rewritten as r∗(B∗ −B)− (r−
r∗)B = r∗(B∗ −B)− (r− r∗)D+ (r− r∗)L, which is the net return on central bank assets at the world
interest rate, minus subsidies on deposits, plus taxes on loans, if r > r∗.
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When the central bank sets r = r∗ it can replicate the open economy. In general, we
consider three policy regimes, which correspond to different constraints imposed on the
set of policy instruments:
Definition 1 (Policy regimes) We define the following policy regimes:
• The closed economy, where B∗ = 0 and r ∈ <+;
• The open economy, where B∗ ∈ < and r = r∗;
• The semi-open economy, where B∗ ∈ < and r ∈ <+
In the semi-open economy regime, the central bank uses its exclusive access to foreign
bonds to set the domestic supply of liquidity and manipulate the domestic interest rate
as it wishes. Since this is the more general case, we will consider optimal policy within
the semi-open economy regime. Indeed, both the open economy and the closed economy
are nested in the semi-open economy. In the closed economy, the central bank’s access
to reserve accumulation is restricted, so neither the central bank nor the private agents
can trade foreign bonds. In the open economy regime, we assume that the central bank
provides the desired supply Bt at interest rate r
∗ to the private sector. This is equivalent
to let the private sector buy directly foreign assets as Bt and B
∗
t are perfect substitutes
in this case. In this regime, the optimal interest rate is equal to the world interest rate
r∗ and capital controls are unnecessary. But when the optimal r differs from r∗, capital
controls are welfare-improving.
As a Ramsey planner, the central bank will choose a decentralized equilibrium to
maximize its social objective:
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
u(cDs ) + u(c
L
s )
]
(10)
In the next section, we describe the decentralized equilibrium and in Section 4 we analyze
optimal policies.
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3 Decentralized equilibrium
In this section, we examine the properties of a decentralized equilibrium for a given
policy. First, we describe how the credit constraint affects consumption behavior and
leads to additional saving. Then, we analyze the steady state and determine the condi-
tions under which the economy is constrained. At the end of the section, as a benchmark
case, we analyze a growing open economy without any policy intervention. In order to
get analytical results, this section considers the case of a logarithmic utility function
u(ct) = log(ct).
We define a decentralized equilibrium as follows:
Definition 2 (Decentralized equilibrium) Given initial conditions r0L0, r0D0, and
B∗0 , a decentralized equilibrium under a given policy regime is a sequence of prices {rt}t≥0,
allocations {Dt+1, Lt+1, cDt , cLt }t≥0 and central bank policy {Bt+1, B∗t+1, τt}t≥0 such that:
(i) given the price system and the central bank policy, the allocation solves the households’
problems (equations (2)–(7) are satisfied); (ii) given the allocation and the price system,
the central bank policy satisfies the sequence of central bank budget constraints (9) and
a given policy regime; (iii) equilibrium in the domestic bond market (8) is satisfied; (iv)
B∗t > −A for some large positive A.
The last condition rules out ponzi schemes by the central bank. As explained in
Section 2, the sequence of taxes τt can be constant or variable across time depending on
whether the central bank has access to the fiscal instrument.
3.1 Precautionary Saving
In the absence of credit constraints and with log-utility, households would consume a
fixed fraction of their intertemporal wealth:
cD∗t =
1− β
τt
( ∞∑
k=0
Yt+2k∏2k
i=1 rt+i
+
∞∑
k=0
aYt+2k+1∏2k+1
i=1 rt+i
− rtLt
)
, (11)
cL∗t =
1− β
τt
( ∞∑
k=0
aYt+2k∏2k
i=1 rt+i
+
∞∑
k=0
Yt+2k+1∏2k+1
i=1 rt+i
+ rtDt
)
. (12)
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Then, the unconstrained (or notional) demands for deposits and loans D∗t+1 and L
∗
t+1 are
given by replacing cD∗t and c
L∗
t in the budget constraints (2) and (3).
To understand what happens when cash-rich households are constrained in t + 1,
we use the Euler equation to substitute for consumptions in the budget constraints and
derive the demand for deposits:
Dt+1 =
1
1 + β
(
β(Yt − rtLt)− aYt+1
rt+1
− Lt+2
rt+1
)
(13)
Since deposits are used to smooth consumption between the cash-rich period and the
cash-poor period, they depend negatively on future borrowings Lt+2. As the credit con-
straint imposes that Lt+2 ≤ L∗t+2, we have then Dt+1 ≥ D∗t+1. This means that when
households anticipate that their borrowing capacity will be limited in the future, they
save more. More specifically, the level of loans contracted by cash-poor households that
are constrained in t is given by:
Lt+1 =
φYt+1
rt+1
(14)
The interest rate rt+1 that clears the market for domestic liquidity must be such that
total deposits Dt+1 equal outside liquidity Bt+1 and inside liquidity Lt+1, as stated by
equation (8), for a given level of Bt+1.
3.2 Liquidity Supply in the Steady State
Whether the economy is constrained or not depends on the adequation of supply
and demand for liquidity. An economy with a tight constraint needs a larger supply
of liquidity B. This can be analyzed precisely in the deterministic steady state (since
there is no uncertainty). For a given constant level of Y , a steady state is a decentralized
equilibrium with constant liquidity provision B, reserve holdings B∗ and taxes τ satisfying
the central bank budget constraint (9).
The following proposition characterizes the steady states of the model depending on
the amount of liquidity B. For the sake of simplicity, the analysis is restricted to symmet-
ric equilibria where both types of households have the same (possibly state-dependent)
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level of consumptions and wealths.10
Proposition 1 If B
Y
< β
(
1−a
1+β
− 2φ
)
, there is a unique steady state with a binding credit
constraint where the interest rate r < 1/β increases with B
Y
. The ratio of relative con-
sumption depends on r: c
L
cD
= βr < 1.
If B
Y
≥ β
(
1−a
1+β
− 2φ
)
, the credit constraint does not bind and symmetric steady states
are characterized by βr = 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 implies that a binding credit constraint leads to a lower interest rate.
This is the case when φ is low and B/Y is small. When the constraint binds, cash-poor
households are not able to supply enough liquid assets to cash-rich households because
of their limited collateral. As a result, liquidity is overpriced compared to the first best,
which corresponds to a depressed interest rate. It also prevents cash-poor households
from transferring some of their consumption from the next to the current period, so that
consumption is lower in the L-state than in the D-state.
The provision of liquidity by the central bank affects the decentralized equilibrium
in the following way. A larger amount of bonds B provides more saving instruments to
cash-rich households, alleviating the limited supply of bonds by cash-poor households
and decreasing the price of liquidity. As shown in Proposition 1, this results in a higher
interest rate. As the steady-state supply of public bonds increases, the interest rate
increases until it reaches r = 1/β. At that point, the constraint stops binding and the
supply of public bonds has no more effect on the interest rate and the allocation of
resources.
Based on the Proposition, we define liquidity-scarce and liquidity-abundant countries
as follows:
Definition 3 A liquidity-scarce country is one where φ < 1−a
2(1+β)
. A liquidity-abundant
country is one where φ ≥ 1−a
2(1+β)
.
10Equilibria where the borrowing constraint binds for both groups of households when cash-poor are
always symmetric as wealth is pinned down by the borrowing constraint. However, when the constraint
does not bind for at least one group of households when cash-poor, there is a continuum of equilibria
corresponding to different levels of wealth.
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In a liquidity-scarce country, agents need a positive supply of bonds by the central
bank to achieve a first-best steady state, because private agents supply insufficient liq-
uidity. In contrast, in a liquidity-abundant country there is no need for public supply of
liquidity since private agents issue more bonds.
Corollary 1 (Closed economy) Consider a closed economy with no taxes (τ = 1) and
therefore B = 0. If the economy is liquidity-abundant, the credit constraint does not bind
in the steady state and βr = 1. If it is liquidity-scarce, the constraint binds in the steady
state and cL/cD = βr < 1.
Corollary 2 (Open economy) Consider an open economy with βr∗ = 1 and no taxes
(τ = 1). The constraint does not bind in the steady state and B
∗
Y
= B
Y
≥ β
(
1−a
1+β
− 2φ
)
.
If the economy is liquidity-scarce, then B
∗
Y
≥ 0.
Corollary 1 shows that, if the country is liquidity-scarce and in the absence of tax-
ation, there is an insufficient domestic supply of liquidity in the closed economy, so
households are credit constrained in the long run. In contrast, Corollary 2 shows that
reserve accumulation by the central bank in the open economy allows to eliminate the
credit constraints.
That B∗ > 0 makes the borrowing constraint unbinding in liquidity-scarce countries,
which is socially optimal as we will see, depends in particular on the absence of taxes.
As suggested by Holmstrom and Tirole (2002, 2011), when taxes are distortionary, the
international capital market is the best source for domestic liquidity. Thus, it is optimal
for the central bank to simply serve as intermediary between the private sector and
the international capital market. Equivalently, it would be optimal to liberalize private
capital flows when the economy is in the steady state with βr∗ = 1.
While the steady state provides tractable solutions and interesting insights, it seems
more relevant to analyze growing economies. In this case, even the open economy might
face binding borrowing constraints on the convergence path before reaching the steady
state. We examine the optimal policy in the next section, but as a benchmark it is useful
to examine the dynamics of the open economy.
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3.3 The Convergence of Open Economies
Consider a growing open economy without planner’s intervention, that is τ = 1 and
r = r∗ = 1/β. The endowment is growing at rate gt, i.e., Yt+1 = (1 + gt+1)Yt . We
consider an economy where gt is driven by the following process:
gt+1 = µgt , (15)
where 0 ≤ µ < 1. This is for example the case of an economy that catches up toward
the world’s productivity frontier. We examine in particular whether the economy is
constrained on the convergence path and whether it is asymptotically constrained or
unconstrained.
In the open economy case, each household faces the world interest rate, so it behaves
independently from the others. It is therefore sufficient to examine the behavior of a
given household. The open economy is then only the aggregation over the two groups of
households.
Proposition 2 Consider an open economy with βr∗ = 1 and no taxes (τ = 1). If cash-
poor households are constrained in t and gt is small, then they are constrained in all their
subsequent cash-poor periods and unconstrained in all their subsequent cash-rich periods.
Moreover, λt+2k+1 ' µ2k(1 + µ)1−φ+µβa+µ2β2φ1−φ+βa+β2φ gt, k ≥ 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The Proposition gives conditions for the credit constraints to stay binding, as well as
an approximation for λ. Notice that when µ goes to one, which corresponds to permanent
growth, the value of λ goes to 2g. More importantly, the economy stays constrained on
the convergence path but is asymptotically unconstrained (limt→∞ λt+1 = 0).
Notice that the growing economy does not need to be liquidity-scarce in the sense of
Definition 3 to be constrained. Definition 3 corresponds to liquidity needs in a closed-
economy steady state with no growth. In an open economy, liquidity is available in infinite
amounts on international markets. However, a growing economy can be constrained for
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any level of φ < 1 because growth generates a strong need for borrowing to smooth
consumption.
If agents are initially unconstrained, they liquidate their assets progressively as g goes
to zero. If initial wealth is low, if g converges to zero slowly and if credit constraints are
stringent (φ is small), then they eventually end up with binding constraints.
4 Optimal policy
The optimal policy crucially depends on the set of instruments available to the planner.
As explained in Section 2, we first consider the case where the planner can change the
supply of liquidity Bt and holdings of international reserves B
∗
t but not the level of the
distortive tax, which is fixed once and for all to τ . The consumption tax τ is then used
to balance the intertemporal budget constraint of the central bank, but not to affect the
intertemporal choices of the agents. In the next section, we consider the case where the
planner can freely choose the level of the consumption tax τt − 1 every period.
We consider the optimal policy both in the steady state and in an economy converging
to its steady state. In both cases, we find that it is optimal to accumulate reserves.
Moreover, when the economy is away from its steady state, it is optimal to have rt
diverge from r∗.
4.1 The Ramsey Problem
To analyze optimal policy we consider the Ramsey planner under the semi-open econ-
omy regime. The planner maximizes its objective (10) subject to the household budget
constraints (2) and (3), their first order conditions (5) and (6), the credit constraint (4)
and the aggregate resource constraint. The latter is found using the equilibrium on the
bond market (8) and the agents’ budget constraints. Maximization is carried out with
respect to {Lt+1, Dt+1, B∗t+1, cDt , cLt , rt+1}t≥0. The Lagrangian of the Ramsey’s problem in
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the semi-open economy is then defined as follows:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
u(cDt ) + u(c
L
t )
+γDt
[
Yt − τcDt −Dt+1 − rtLt
]
+γLt
[
aYt + rtDt + Lt+1 − τcLt
]
+γGt
[
r∗B∗t −B∗t+1 + (1 + a)Yt − cDt − cLt
]
+κDt
[
u′(cDt )− βrt+1u′(cLt+1)
]
+κLt
[
u′(cLt )− βrt+1u′(cDt+1)(1 + λt+1)
]
+ Λt [φYt − rtLt]
}
To determine whether the planner wants to deviate from the open economy regime
with r = r∗, we focus on the first order condition with respect to rt+1:
γLt+1Dt+1 − (γDt+1 + Λt+1)Lt+1 − κDt u′(cLt+1)− κLt u′(cDt+1)(1 + λt+1) = 0 (16)
The first two terms reflect the direct distributive effects between depositors and borrowers
(or cash-rich and cash-poor households). The last two terms reflect the effect of the
interest rate on the intertemporal choices of households. These terms reflect the potential
need for pigovian taxation.
Optimal policy obeys complex motives. In order to understand what the trade-offs
of the central bank are, we proceed in two steps. First, we evaluate the above first-
order condition in an open economy with no central bank intervention in a constrained
transition path as the one studied in the previous section. We then simulate the optimal
semi-open regime, i.e., the one that satisfies the FOCs of the above Ramsey problem.
4.2 Is the Open Economy Optimal?
We define by I∗t+1 the left-hand side of (16) evaluated at rt+1 = r
∗. To determine
whether rt+1 should be lower or higher than r
∗, we look at the sign of I∗t+1. If I
∗
t+1 is
positive, then the central bank can increase social welfare by raising the interest rate.
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If I∗t+1 is negative, then it can increase social welfare by lowering the interest rate. In
general, any deviation of I∗t+1 from zero means that the open economy is suboptimal.
First, we can show that, if the economy is constrained along the convergence path,
κDt = κ
L
t+1 = 0, for all t ≥ 0. This means that there is no Pigovian tax after the first
period. This is because distorting the households’ intertemporal choices is ineffective
when credit constraints are binding. As a result, I∗t+1 is simply equal to the direct
redistributive effect of the interest rate. Using the other FOCs of the planner’s program,
it can be written as follows for all t ≥ 1 (see the Appendix for more details):
I∗t+1 =
( ∞∑
i=1
Λt+2i
)
Dt+1 −
( ∞∑
i=0
Λt+1+2i
)
Lt+1 (17)
The first term corresponds to the net effect of the interest rate on depositors and is obvi-
ously positive. The second term corresponds to the net effect of the interest rate on loan
issuers. This term is negative because a high interest rate hurts the households who issued
loans in the previous period (the current cash-rich households) through higher interest
payment, and makes the credit constraint more stringent for the cash-poor households.
The fact that I∗t+1 is not necessarily equal to zero means that the decentralized alloca-
tion is not optimal and that the central bank can improve welfare. This comes from the
fact that private agents are credit-constrained, which hinders the intratemporal and in-
tertemporal allocation of resources. In that context, the planner, who faces no constraint,
can use its available instruments to improve the allocation of resources. This justification
for public intervention, and in particular for capital controls, is different from the exter-
nality view that has been put forward in the literature (Benigno et al., 2010, Korinek,
2010, Jeanne and Korinek, 2011).
According to Proposition 2, an open economy that is constrained on its transition
path is unconstrained in the long run as long as its growth is asymptotically zero. This
implies that I∗t+1 converges to zero, as Λ goes to zero. The central bank has no incentives
to redistribute wealth by distorting the interest rate in the steady state as the utilities of
the two groups of agents converge. This means that an open economy in the steady state
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is at the Ramsey optimum. This is because, as described in Corollary 2, this economy
has accumulated a sufficient amount of reserves.
As argued above, in the open economy, it does not matter whether the accumulation
of foreign assets takes place through reserve accumulation or private capital flows. In the
long run, the open economy would still be optimal if private agents had the right to trade
foreign bonds. However, in the transition, since Λ > 0, I∗t+1 can be either positive or
negative, which means that the central bank has incentives to manipulate the domestic
interest rate by setting capital controls and taking charge of the foreign trade in bonds. In
that case, the accumulation of foreign bonds necessarily takes place through the central
bank, even if capital controls are irrelevant in the long run.
The sign of I∗t+1 depends on the relative size of Dt and Lt as well as on the evolution
of the shadow cost of credit constraints, Λt. We can derive the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 If Λt+3 = ξ
2Λt+1 for all t ≥ 1, with 0 ≤ ξ < 1, then I∗t+1 is of the same sign
as Dt+1/Lt+1 − Λt+1/Λt+2 for all t ≥ 1.
Proof. This Lemma derives directly from the definition of I∗t+1. Indeed, I
∗
t+1 =
(Λt+2Dt+1 − Λt+1Lt+1)/(1− ξ2).
The interpretation is as follows. The incentives for the central bank to raise the
interest rate are strong if the amount of deposits is large as compared to the amount of
loans, since (r−r∗)(D−L) represent the net quantity of resources that will be distributed
to households. On the other hand, I∗t+1 is decreasing in the ratio between the shadow costs
of the current and future credit constraints. Indeed, if the constraints faced by today’s
borrowers are more stringent than those faced by future borrowers (today’s depositors),
then it is better to transfer resources to the former by decreasing debt repayments.
When we consider the specific process for converging endowments described in (15),
we can derive the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Consider an open economy with βr∗ = 1 and no taxes (τ = 1) that is
constrained in t, with gt small. If gt+1 = µgt, 0 ≤ µ < 1, gt > 0, then I∗t+1 is of the same
sign as 1−a
(1+1/µ)(1+β)
− φ.
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As mentioned, the sign of I∗t+1 is ambiguous and depends both on the size of loans L
as compared to the size of deposits D and on the size of Λt+1 as compared to Λt+2. The
size of Λt+1 as compared to Λt+2 is governed by µ. When µ is small, the convergence
speed of g is high and future constraints are less stringent than the current ones. In that
case, it is optimal for the central bank to decrease the domestic interest rate in order
to subsidize the currently constrained agents. When µ is large, growth is sustained, and
future constraints are stringent. In that case, the central bank might want to increase
the interest rate to subsidize the agents who will be constrained in the future and who
are currently holding deposits. However, I∗t+1 also depends on D/L, which is governed
by φ and a. If φ and a are small enough, the liquidity needs of cash-poor households are
strong and the central bank can still have an incentive to increase the interest rate. In
general, whether I∗t+1 is positive or negative, the open economy regime is suboptimal on
a constrained transition path.
To better understand the intuition of the result in Proposition 3, it is useful to consider
two limit cases, corresponding to an economy of either borrowers or lenders only. Consider
first the limit a→ 1 (all households receive the same endowment): in that case, the model
reduces to a standard representative agent. This representative agent is prevented by the
binding borrowing constraint to consume early on its growing future endowment. The
planner can help by decreasing the interest rate, which amounts to subsidize borrowing.
This alleviates the borrowing constraint and helps the household transfer resources from
the next to the current period. According to Proposition 3, the sign of I∗t+1 is indeed
strictly negative when a → 1. A similar result arises when µ → 0. In that case, the
constraint lasts only one period. The objective of the planner is simply to alleviate
today’s constraint, and it is then optimal to decrease the interest rate.
Consider next the limit φ → 0, in which no borrowing is possible. Then lenders try
to accumulate assets to transfer resources from the cash-rich to their cash-poor periods.
As shown in Corollary 2, in a steady state at the world interest rate, they can accumu-
late enough assets to fully self-insure against income fluctuations. Then, the borrowing
constraint does not bind and the central planner cannot improve on the open economy.
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However, with a growing endowment the world interest rate is not large enough to al-
low lenders to accumulate enough assets. Then, the planner can help by increasing the
interest rate above its world level, which amounts to subsidizing saving. According to
Proposition 3, the sign of I∗t+1 is indeed strictly positive when φ → 0, and all the more
so as growth is sustained, i.e. as µ is large.
4.3 The Ramsey Policy
The basic conclusion is that it is generally optimal to set rt 6= r∗, i.e., to deviate
from the open economy regime.11 The actual optimal policy, however, cannot be derived
analytically so that we simulate the semi-open economy under the Ramsey policy, with
different parameter specifications.12 The resulting optimal interest rates are shown in
Figure 3. In the baseline, we set µ = 0.4 , a = 0 and φ = 0.1. At t = 0, the economy
is supposed to be in a steady state where B
Y
= β
(
1−a
1+β
− 2φ
)
so that the borrowing
constraint is (marginally) non-binding. At t = 1, the economy start growing at an initial
rate of 10%. This case generates a higher interest rate in the transition to the steady
state, as the convergence speed is low and liquidity needs are strong. We then lower µ to
0.1. The figure shows that, as predicted by Proposition 3, the central bank has then an
incentive to lower the interest rate. The picture is the same when we raise φ to 0.2 and
a to 0.5.
Figure 4 gives the dynamics of the semi-open economy in the baseline case where
growth is sustained and liquidity needs are strong and compares it with the open econ-
omy. In this case, borrowers at the beginning of the growth episode suffer because the
high interest rate makes their constraint more stringent and increases their debt repay-
ments (cL is below its open-economy value). Consistently, they borrow less than in the
open economy. But later, borrowers benefit from the larger return of their liquid assets.
11Strictly speaking, the optimal policy could also consist in adjusting the tax rate τ . For example,
the government might want to decrease τ to transfer resources to constrained agents. However, this can
easily violate the government intertemporal budget constraint. In that example, the government would
need to decrease the domestic interest rate to generate resources. In our simulations, this was however
never a solution. This is because decreasing the interest rate makes the credit constraints more stringent,
necessitating a further decrease in τ , which again imposes a decrease in the interest rate.
12The model is simulated with DYNARE (Adjemian et al., 2011).
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Depositors consume slightly less than in the open economy because they have to spend
more on interest payments. This policy is welfare-improving because future constraints
are stringent and the demand for deposits is large as compared to the demand for loans:
increasing the return on liquid assets alleviates future constraints without making the
current ones excessively stringent. To increase the domestic interest rate, the Central
Bank increases the supply of public bonds B. In the short run, reserve accumulation is
also faster. But in the long run, because this policy is costly (more interest on public
bonds have to be paid), the level of reserves is lower.
Figure 5 gives the dynamics with a more short-lived growth and stronger liquidity
needs (we set µ = 0.3 and φ = 0.2). In this case, borrowers benefit from the lower interest
rate at the beginning of the growth episode as they can borrow more. But later, they
suffer from the lower return on their liquid assets. Depositors consume more because
they pay less interests on their debt. This policy is welfare-improving because credit
constraints are front-loaded, so it is more efficient to alleviate the current constraints
by lowering the interest rate. Besides, the demand for loans is large as compared to the
demand for liquidity. The central bank can therefore transfer more resources to the agents
by decreasing the interest rate. To decrease the domestic interest rate, the Central Bank
decreases the supply of public bonds. This translates into a slower reserve accumulation
in the short run. But in the long run, since this policy creates additional resources for
the central bank (the central bank pays a lower interest rate on its debt), the country
accumulates more external reserves.
5 Optimal Policy with Flexible Tax Rates
Giving more instruments to the planner may drastically change the optimal policy.
In this section, we consider the case where the planner can choose the optimal tax rate of
consumption τt−1 at each period. On a transition path, it is still optimal to have rt 6= r∗,
but it is no longer optimal to accumulate reserves. This is because the set of taxes is
complete, but not redundant. The domestic interest rate and the consumption tax are
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sufficient to replicate the first best, so reserve accumulation is not needed anymore to
overcome the credit constraints. A growing economy actually becomes a net debtor, as
in the first best. But the government is compelled to use the domestic interest rate in
the absence of an alternative tax.
When the planner has the full use of the consumption tax, it can actually overcome the
borrowing constraint and transfer consumptions both across periods and across house-
holds. It can thus achieve a first best allocation where borrowing constraints never bind
and the marginal utility of consumption is constant both across periods and households.
With a growing endowment as in (15), the planner adjusts the tax rate (potentially
negative) so that households consume part of their future income and have a constant
consumption. In this process, the planner borrows abroad (or depletes foreign reserves).
This case is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Consider an endowment stream {Yt}t≥0, initial conditions r0D0, r0L0,
B∗0 , with r0L0 < Y0, and a real number ρ > 0. There exists a sequence of policy instru-
ments {Bt+1, B∗t+1, τt}t≥0 such that in the corresponding decentralized equilibrium borrow-
ing constraints never bind, each household has a constant consumption, and the ratio of
consumptions for both types of households is equal to cL0 /c
D
0 = ρ.
Proof. See Appendix E.
As the Proposition shows, the planner can achieve any allocation such that the bor-
rowing constraints do not bind and the ratio of consumptions for both types of households
stays constant. In particular, it can choose the same level of consumption for both types
of households by setting ρ = 1: this allocation maximizes the welfare function (10).
Although this does not necessarily maximize welfare, the planner can also replicate the
open economy with no borrowing constraints by setting an appropriate ratio ρ. This im-
plies that the planner can always Pareto-improve on the open economy with (potentially)
binding constraints.
The proof of the Proposition consists in explicitly constructing the family of alloca-
tions with constant consumptions and lax constraints. Intuitively, the planner can tax
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or subsidize consumption to transfer wealth across agents and periods. Subsidies are fi-
nanced by borrowing abroad or depleting reserves and the product of taxes can be saved
by buying foreign reserves. However, as can be seen from equations (5) and (6), changes
in the tax rate distort the Euler equation of households. To make sure that agents choose
a constant consumption stream, the planner has to move the domestic real interest rate
away from the world interest rate so that the tax-adjusted interest rate rt+1τt/τt+1 stays
equal to the world rate. Thus, in general, the optimal policy requires the economy to
deviate from the open economy, as shown in the following Corollary.
Corollary 3 Consider an endowment stream {Yt}t≥0, initial repayments on deposits and
loans r∗D0 and r∗L0, and initial foreign reserves B∗0 = D0 − L0 such that the borrowing
constraint binds at some date t ≥ 0 in the open economy with zero taxes ( i.e. with
τt = 1,∀t ≥ 0). Then, along the optimal policy, rt deviates from r∗ for some date t.
Proof. We know from Proposition 4 that optimal policy requires lax constraints and
constant consumption. Then, compared with the open economy with no taxes, optimal
policy requires either a change in the tax rate or in the domestic interest rate. Also,
from the first order conditions (5) and (6), we must have rt+1τt = r
∗τt+1. Suppose the
domestic interest rate stays equal to r∗. Then the tax rate can only change once and for
all at t = 0. From the government budget constraint (9), this implies that B∗t will diverge
either to +∞ or −∞. The former is not optimal. The latter violate the upper limit on
net foreign debt. We conclude that the domestic interest rate has to diverge from the
world interest rate.
This case provides another justification for imposing capital controls during the con-
vergence to the steady state. In the previous section, it was the binding constraint and
absence of tax instruments that justified a different interest rate. In this section, the jus-
tification comes from distortionary taxes. The planner needs the domestic interest rate
to deviate from the world interest rate to offset the distortionary effect of the tax. But if
the planner had access to an alternative tax, like a tax on the interest rate, distorting the
domestic interest rate through capital controls would not be necessary. Notice that both
reasons disappear once we reach a steady state (assuming βr∗ = 1). As a conclusion, both
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the recourse to reserve accumulation and capital controls arise as a result of incomplete
taxation.
Figure 6 shows an example of optimal policy when taxes are flexible and compares it
to the case where they are not in an economy on the convergence path described by (15).
The parameters are set to their baseline values (µ = 0.4, a = 0, φ = 0.1). When taxes are
flexible, the planner sets a large subsidy in the first period so that consumption jumps
to its constant first best level, and taxes consumption later on. It also issues bonds,
allowing agents to save part of their subsidy to overcome the borrowing constraints in
the subsequent periods. This raises the domestic interest rate and exactly offset the
future increase in tax rates in households’ Euler equations. As the economy, in the
aggregate, consumes the permanent value of its growing endowment from the start, this
policy requires running a current account deficit during the transition: foreign reserves
decrease.
6 Accumulation of Reserves and Capital Controls in
China
Since the paper is motivated by developments in the Chinese economy in the last
decade, it is interesting to compare the implications of the model with these developments.
First, consider our basic assumptions. China has strict limits to capital mobility, in
particular on outflows, while the central bank is very active on international capital
markets. This corresponds well to the semi-open economy. Moreover, most households
and firms have very limited access to finance. It is well known that state-owned enterprises
receive most of the banks’ credit. In addition, the potential need for funds is high, due
for example to a lack of a social safety net or to various life-cycle considerations in a
fast-growing economy, e.g., funding for education, starting own business projects (e.g.,
see Yang et al., 2011). In the empirical literature, income uncertainty and poor access to
finance in China are actually considered as the main drivers of the high private saving
rate in that country and of global imbalances (IMF, 2009, Chamon and Prasad, 2010,
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Forbes, 2009). Another important assumption is the high and sustained growth rate.
China experienced an average growth rate of 10% from 2001 to 2010.
The first implication of our model is that it is optimal for the central bank to issue
liquidity to the private sector and to accumulate international reserves. This is exactly
what Figures 1 and 2 show. Thus, the accumulation of reserves of the Chinese central
bank can be part of an optimal plan, even though our model is too stylized to determine
quantitatively whether the magnitude of reserves accumulation is optimal.
The other implication is that it is optimal to impose capital controls so that the
domestic interest rate can differ from the foreign rate. Our model predicts that in the
Chinese context it is optimal to keep the domestic interest rate temporarily higher than
the international one. Indeed, it appears reasonable to characterize the Chinese economy
with a low value of φ, reflecting tight credit constraints, a low value of a, reflecting
high level of income uncertainty and heterogeneity, and a high value for µ, reflecting
sustained growth. If we consider Proposition 3, the combination of low φ and a and high
µ imply that a high interest rate is desirable. This implies an accumulation of reserves
that is larger than what would happen in an open economy. Intuitively, with growth
expected to stay high in the coming years, China should worry that the private sector
might face strong funding constraints for consumption or investment needs for a long
time. Increasing the interest rate on saving instruments should then help the private
sector accumulate assets to fund those future needs.
Comparing the models’ implications with Chinese interest rate policy is tricky because
our theory abstracts from various aspects such as inflation, nominal exchange rates,
spreads between loan and deposit rates, term spreads, etc. However, it is safe to argue
that the policy observed in China in the last decade does not correspond to the optimal
policy produced by our model. If anything, Chinese authorities are notorious for trying to
keep interest rates on saving instruments (such as deposits) at a low level through several
channels, including moral suasion (Green, 2005). Our results suggests that this policy is
not socially optimal. It helps current borrowers at the expense of future borrowers who
should be favored instead. Actually, this policy aims at subsidizing loans to state-owned
25
enterprises (Fung et al., 2000, Laurens and Maino, 2007), which are less credit-constrained
than private firms. This means that not only does this policy fail at transferring resources
to depositors, but it also fails at alleviating the current credit constraints of borrowers.
Our theory does not feature a spread between loan and deposit rates, but it suggests
that this spread should be kept to a minimum. However, the four state-owned commercial
banks have a quasi monopoly in China’s financial market (Wong and Wong, 2001, Berger
and al., 2009). This situation is likely to maintain monopoly rents that inflate the spread
between loan and deposit rates. Besides, despite the substantial interest rate liberalization
that took place in October 2004, the authorities still impose a ceiling on deposit rates and
a floor on lending rate as a means to preserve intermediation margins (Laurens and Maino,
2007). This policy maintains a lower bound on the spread, which is suboptimal because
it generates rents, but also because it further hinders the optimal allocation of resources
according to our model, even though it might be partly justified by the mitigation of
credit risk. In practice, it seems that these measures are effective in maintaining low
interest rates on deposits. This is evident from the fact that the People’s Bank of China
has managed to contain the cost of sterilization operations associated with international
reserves accumulation, and even to make benefits (Green, 2005, Laurens and Maino,
2007).
7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed optimal policy in a semi-open economy, where the Ramsey
planner is a central bank that has access to international capital markets. We found
that the accumulation of reserves combined with capital controls gives a higher welfare
than full capital mobility in a rapidly growing economy. This characterization clearly
corresponds to the Chinese economy. On the other hand, we found that it would be
optimal to have high interest rates on saving instruments, which is different from what
is observed in China.
The accumulation of assets by a Ramsey planner when consumers are credit con-
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strained may be surprising. Indeed it would seem more intuitive if the planner would
borrow in the international market as an intermediary for the consumers. This would
actually correspond to the first best allocation in a converging phase, as shown in Section
5. But with a limited set of instruments, the central bank is not able to relax the credit
constraint and the optimal policy is lend to, rather than borrow from, the rest of the
world.
Changes in foreign exchange reserves are naturally associated with exchange rate
policy. In our context, the exchange rate does not play a role as the analysis is conducted
in a one-good economy. A natural extension is to add traded and non-traded goods. In
such an extension, international reserve accumulation obviously goes in parallel with a
real depreciation (see Jeanne, 2011). Consequently, a real depreciation would be optimal
if reserve accumulation is. However, this would only be the case in a transition phase.
As the economy approaches its steady state, a higher level of reserves should lead to an
appreciated currency.
Another interesting extension would be to model explicitly the domestic financial
sector. This would give more instruments to the central bank. For example, central bank
liabilities are made of commercial banks’ reserves and of central bank bonds. The central
bank can typically adjust the interest rate on reserves as well as the reserve requirements.
However, reserve requirements do not seem useful in our context as it is optimal to have
high interest rate on deposits.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Assume first that the borrowing constraint is binding. Then, using the expression for
deposits (13) and loans (14) in the steady state, the bond market equilibrium (8) can be
written P (1/r) = 0, with
P (X) = φX2 + [a+ φ(1 + β)]X − [β(1− φ)− (1 + β)B
Y
]
.
It is easy to see that P (β) < 0 if and only if B
Y
< β
(
1−a
1+β
− 2φ
)
. In that case, there is
a unique positive equilibrium interest rate r < 1/β. This equilibrium interest rate is an
increasing function of Y
B
. The ratio of relative consumption is given by the first order
condition (5). The other first order condition, equation (6), implies that the constraint
must be binding when r < β.
Assume now that the borrowing constraint does not bind. From the first order condi-
tions (5) and (6), it is clear that we must have βr = 1 so that consumption will be constant
for both types of households. In a symmetric steady state, it follows that cL = cD. Then,
taking the difference of budget constraints (2) and (3) in the steady state, together with
the bond market equilibrium (8), we get 2L = β
1+β
(1−a)Y −B. The condition such that
the constraint does not bind is L ≤ βφY , which becomes B
Y
≥ β
(
1−a
1+β
− 2φ
)
.
B Proof of Proposition 2
We denote by X˜ = X/Y the normalized variables. Take an agent who is constrained in
t−2, her cash-poor period. We look for conditions under which the agent is constrained for
all t+2k and unconstrained for all t+2k+1, k ≥ 0. We assume that such conditions exist
and derive an expression for λt+2k+1. We then derive conditions under which λt+2k+1 > 0
for all k ≥ 0 and D˜t+2k+1 ≥ 0.
If the agent is constrained for all t + 2k and unconstrained for all t + 2k + 1, k ≥ 0,
then:
c˜Lt+2k =
1
1 + β
[
1− φ
1 + gt+2k
+ βa+ β2φ(1 + gt+2k+1)
]
(18)
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c˜Dt+2k+1 =
1
1 + β
[
(1− φ) + βa(1 + gt+2k+2) + β2φ(1 + gt+2k+2)(1 + gt+2k+3)
]
(19)
Equations (18) and (19) are found by combining the budget constraint (2) and (3)
with (13) and (14).
We then use the Euler equation (6) and βr∗ = 1 to derive the multiplier of the credit
constraint:
1 + λt+2k+1 = (1 + gt+2k+1)
c˜Dt+2k+1
c˜Lt+2k
= (1 + gt+2k)(1 + gt+2k+1)
1− φ+ (1 + gt+2k+2)βa+ (1 + gt+2k+2)(1 + gt+2k+3)β2φ
1− φ+ (1 + gt+2k)βa+ (1 + gt+2k)(1 + gt+2k+1)β2φ
Using the fact that gt+k = µ
kgt ' 0, we approximate:
λt+2k+1 ' gt+2k(1 + µ)1− φ+ µβa+ µ
2β2φ
1− φ+ βa+ β2φ
As long as φ < 1, λt+2k+1 > 0 for all k ≥ 0. This implies that agents are constrained in
all their cash-poor periods.
Finally, we check whether the agents are unconstrained in all their cash-rich periods.
We have:
D˜t =
1
1 + β
[
β
1− φ
1 + gt
− βa− β2φ(1 + gt+1)
]
For the agents not to be constrained in their cash-rich periods, we must have D˜t ≥ −βφ.
For g small, this amounts to a ≤ 1, which is a parametric assumption.
C Derivation of equation 17
For t ≥ 0, by taking the derivative of the Lagrangian L with respect to λt+1, we can
show that κLt = 0. Using the central bank FOCs, we now show that κ
L
t+1 = 0 implies
κDt = 0. Differentiating with respect to reserves gives, with βr
∗ = 1:
γGt = γ
G
t+1 (20)
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The first-order conditions with respect to D and L are, with r = r∗:
γDt = γ
L
t+1 (21)
γLt = γ
D
t+1 + Λt+1 (22)
The planner FOC with respect to cDt and c
L
t+1 are the following:
u′(cDt )− γDt + κDt u′′(cDt )− γGt = 0 (23)
u′(cLt+1)− γLt+1 + κLt+1u′′(cLt+1)− γGt+1 = 0 (24)
From equation (5), we know that u′(cDt ) = u
′(cLt+1). Combining with the above equations,
we obtain:
γLt+1 + γ
G
t+1 − κLt+1u′′(cLt+1) = γDt + γGt − κDt u′′(cDt )
Using the planner FOCs with respect to Dt+1 and B
∗
t+1, we get:
κLt+1u
′′(cLt+1) = κ
D
t u
′′(cDt )
Since κLt+1 = 0 and u
′′ < 0, then κDt = 0 for all t ≥ 0.This yields, for t ≥ 1:
I∗t+1 = γ
L
t+1Dt+1 − (γDt+1 + Λt+1)Lt+1
Using the planner FOCs with respect to D and L, we solve this equation forward and
obtain:
I∗t+1 =
(
γL∞ +
∞∑
i=1
Λt+2i
)
Dt+1 −
(
γD∞ +
∞∑
i=0
Λt+1+2i
)
Lt+1
Since the economy is asymptotically unconstrained according to Proposition 2, we
have γL∞ = γ
D
∞ = γ∞, as implied by equations (21) and (22). Therefore, we have:
I∗t+1 =
( ∞∑
i=1
Λt+2i
)
Dt+1 −
( ∞∑
i=0
Λt+1+2i
)
Lt+1 + γ∞(Dt+1 − Lt+1)
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for all t ≥ 0. Taking t to infinity, we obtain:
lim
t→∞
I∗t+1 = γ∞(D∞ − L∞)
Combining γL∞ = γ
D
∞ = γ∞ with equations (23) and (24) in the steady state, we derive:
u′(cD∞) = u
′(cL∞). This allocation is the social planner solution, that is, it is the solution to
the maximization of (10) under the aggregate budget constraint alone. This means that,
in the steady state, the government cannot achieve a higher welfare by manipulating the
interest rate. Therefore, limt→∞ I∗t+1 = 0, which means that, as long as D∞ − L∞ 6= 0,
the social cost of the individual budget constraints is zero in the long run, that is γ∞ = 0.
Equation (17) is therefore always valid, either because γ∞ = 0 or because D∞−L∞ = 0.
D Proof of Proposition 3
According to Proposition 2, an economy with binding credit constraint and gt+1 = µgt
for all t ≥ 0 satisfies λt+2k+1 ' µ2k(1 +µ)1−φ+µβa+µ2β2φ1−φ+βa+β2φ gt for all k ≥ 1. To derive Lemma
1, we need to relate Λ to λ. We use equations (20)-(24) and the households’ Euler
equations to achieve that.
Using equation (23) expressed in period t + 1 and equation (24) expressed in period
t, t ≥ 1, and using κDt = κLt = 0, we derive:
u′(cLt )− u′(cDt+1)− γLt + γDt+1 − γGt + γGt+1 = 0
Using equations (20)-(22) and the Euler equation for the cash-poor agent, we obtain:
u′(cDt+1)λt+1 = Λt+1
With log-utility, we have:
Λt+1
Λt+2
=
λt+1
λt+2
(1 + gt+2)c˜
D
t+2
c˜Dt+1
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When g is small, this can be approximated as follows:
Λt+1
Λt+2
' 1
µ
This means that Λt+3 = µ
2Λt+1 for all t ≥ 1, which, according to Lemma 1, implies that
I∗t+1 is of the same sign as Dt+1/Lt+1 − Λt+1/Λt+2 ' Dt+1/Lt+1 − 1/µ
Finally, we can approximate:
Dt+1
Lt+1
=
1
1+β
[
β 1−φ
1+gt+1
− βa− β2φ(1 + gt+2)
]
βφ
' 1− a
(1 + β)φ
− 1
This implies that I∗t+1 is of the same sign as Dt+1/Lt+1−1/µ ' (1−a)/(1+β)φ−1−1/µ
for all t ≥ 1.
E Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of Proposition 4 proceeds by construction and consists in three steps.
1. Lemma 2 establishes that an equilibrium allocation corresponding to an endowment
stream and a certain class of policy instruments is also the equilibrium allocation of
the open economy with zero tax corresponding to a modified stream of endowments.
In the following, we refer to this open economy environment as “the associated open
economy problem”.
2. We show how the planner can choose a sequence of policy instruments to get a
stream of endowments in the associated open economy problem such that the bor-
rowing constraint never binds and the ratio of consumption between both types of
agents equals an arbitrary strictly positive number ρ.
3. From Lemma 2 this allocation also obtains in the semi-open economy with the
chosen set of policy instruments.
Lemma 2 Consider an endowment stream {Yt}t≥0, and initial conditions r0D0, r0L0,
B∗0 . Consider a set of policy instruments {B¯t+1, B¯∗t+1, τ¯t}t≥0 that satisfy the central bank’s
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budget constraint (9), and such that
∑
t≥0
1
(r∗)t
[
(1 + a)
Yt
τ¯t
]
+ r0
D0 − L0
τ¯0
=
∑
t≥0
1
(r∗)t
[(1 + a)Yt] + r
∗B∗0 (25)
and that rt+1
τ¯t
τ¯t+1
= r∗. Let {c¯Dt , c¯Lt }t≥0 denote the corresponding equilibrium allocation.
Then, {c¯Dt , c¯Lt }t≥0 is also the decentralized equilibrium associated to the open economy
regime, the sequence of taxes τt = 1, ∀t ≥ 0, the endowment stream {Ytτ¯t }t≥0, and initial
deposits and loans r∗D0
τ0
and r∗L0
τ0
.
The intuition of the lemma is the following: from the point of view of a household, it
is equivalent
1. to have an initial wealth W0, an endowment stream {Yt}t≥0, face a sequence of
interest rates {rt+1}t≥0 and taxes {τ¯t}t≥0,
2. or to have an initial wealth W0/τ¯0, an endowment stream {Yt/τ¯t}t≥0 and face a
sequence of interest rates {rt+1 τ¯tτ¯t+1}t≥0 with zero taxes.
In both cases, the equilibrium sequence of consumption will be the same. If policy
instruments are such that rt+1
τ¯t
τ¯t+1
= r∗, the allocation that solves the semi-open economy
problem with non-zero taxes can then be associated to an open economy problem with
zero taxes. The following proof derives this result in a more rigorous way.
Proof. First note that the central bank can always set {B¯t+1, B¯∗t+1}t≥0 to target any
sequence of domestic interest rates {rt+1}t≥0: it just needs to provide loans and deposits
at those rates and let agents choose their desired levels of loans and deposits. The
corresponding sequence {B¯t+1, B¯∗t+1}t≥0 then follows from equilibrium in the bond market
and the central bank’s budget constraints.
Denote pt the date-0 price of a unit of consumption good at date t for households.
We normalize p0 = 1. We have pt+1 =
pt
rt+1
.
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The equilibrium allocation {c¯Dt , c¯Lt }t≥0 is the solution to the following set of equations,
∑
t≥0
[
p2t(Y2t − τ¯2tcD2t) + p2t+1(aY2t+1 − τ¯2t+1cL2t+1)
]− r0L0 = 0 , (26)
∑
t≥0
[
p2t(aY2t − τ¯2tcL2t) + p2t+1(Y2t+1 − τ¯2t+1cD2t+1)
]
+ r0D0 = 0 , (27)
∑
t≥0
1
(r∗)t
[(1 + a)Yt] + r
∗B∗0 =
∑
t≥0
1
(r∗)t
(c¯Dt + c¯
L
t ) , (28)
t∑
s=0
[
p2s(Y2s − τ¯2scD2s) + p2s+1(aY2s+1 − τ¯2s+1cL2s+1)
]− r0L0 + p2t+2φY2t+2 ≥ 0 , (29)
t∑
s=0
[
p2s(aY2s − τ¯2scL2s) +
t−1∑
s=0
p2s+1(Y2s+1 − τ¯2s+1cD2s+1)
]
+ r0D0 + p2t+1φY2t+1 ≥ 0 , (30)
u′(cDt ) = βrt+1
τ¯t
τ¯t+1
u′(cLt+1) , (31)
u′(cLt ) = βrt+1
τ¯t
τ¯t+1
(1 + λt+1)u
′(cDt+1) , (32)
and the associated slackness conditions. Equations (26) and (27) are the intertemporal
budget constraints of both agents, equation (28) the intertemporal resource constraint,
and equations (29) and (30) are the borrowing constraints written as of date 0.
The condition on domestic interest rates rt+1 = r
∗ τ¯t+1
τ¯t
implies that pt =
τ¯0
τ¯t
1
(r∗)t . The
equations defining the equilibrium allocation can then be rewritten
∑
t≥0
[
1
(r∗)2t
(Y2t
τ¯2t
− cD2t
)
+
1
(r∗)2t+1
(
a
Y2t+1
τ¯2t+1
− cL2t+1
)]
− r0L0
τ¯0
= 0 ,
∑
t≥0
[
1
(r∗)2t
(
a
Y2t
τ¯2t
− cL2t
)
+
1
(r∗)2t+1
(Y2t+1
τ¯2t+1
− cD2t+1
)]
+ r0
D0
τ¯0
= 0 ,
∑
t≥0
1
(r∗)t
[(1 + a)Yt] + r
∗B∗0 =
∑
t≥0
1
(r∗)t
(c¯Dt + c¯
L
t ) ,
t∑
s=0
[
1
(r∗)2s
(Y2s
τ¯2s
− cD2s
)
+
1
(r∗)2s+1
(
a
Y2s+1
τ¯2s+1
− cL2s+1
)]
− r0L0
τ¯0
+
1
(r∗)2t+1
φ
Y2t+2
τ¯2t+2
≥ 0 ,
t∑
s=0
[
1
(r∗)2s
(
a
Y2s
τ¯2s
− cL2s
)
+
t−1∑
s=0
1
(r∗)2s+1
(Y2s+1
τ¯2s+1
− cD2s+1
)]
+ r0
D0
τ¯0
+
1
(r∗)2t+1
φ
Y2t+1
τ¯2t+1
≥ 0 ,
u′(cDt ) = βr
∗u′(cLt+1) ,
u′(cLt ) = βr
∗(1 + λt+1)u′(cDt+1) .
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Given (25), it is straightforward to see that the allocation {c¯Dt , c¯Lt }t≥0 is the decentralized
equilibrium associated to the open economy regime, zero taxes, the endowment stream
{Yt
τ¯t
}t≥0, and initial repayments on deposits and loans r0D0τ0 and r0L0τ0 .
We can now prove Proposition 4.
Proof. Denote {c¯Dt , c¯Lt } an allocation that satisfies the intertemporal resource constraint,
such that consumption is constant for both types of households and cL0 = ρc
D
0 . We will
now choose the policy instruments to make this allocation the equilibrium allocation of
the associated open economy problem.
Denote y¯ =
∑
t≥0 Yt/(r
∗)t∑
t≥0 1/(r∗)t
the permanent value of the endowment stream, and set τ¯t =
Yt/y¯ for t ≥ 3. Then, the stream of endowments in the associated open economy problem,
Yt/τ¯t, is constant and equal to y¯ for t ≥ 3.
Choose τ¯0 sufficiently low so that the following conditions hold:
a
Y0
τ¯0
− c¯L0 + r0
D0
τ¯0
≥ 0 (33a)
Y0
τ¯0
− c¯D0 −
c¯L1
r∗
− r0L0
τ¯0
≥ 0 (33b)
a
Y0
τ¯0
− c¯L0 −
c¯D1
r∗
− c¯
D
2
(r∗)2
+ r0
D0
τ¯0
+
1
(r∗)3
φ
Y3
τ¯3
≥ 0 (33c)
Y0
τ¯0
+ a
1
(r∗)3
Y3
τ¯3
− c¯D0 −
c¯L1
r∗
− c¯
D
2
(r∗)2
− c¯
L
3
(r∗)3
− r0L0
τ¯0
+
1
(r∗)4
φ
Y4
τ¯4
≥ 0 . (33d)
This is possible from the assumption that r0L0 < Y0. Remark that τ¯0 does not depend on
τ¯1 and τ¯2 which have not been set, yet. These four inequalities state that the borrowing
constraint in the associated open economy problem valued at the candidate allocation
{c¯Dt , c¯Lt } is non-binding for t ∈ [0, 3] even in the extreme case when Yt/τ¯t = 0 for t = 2 and
3. This way, the borrowing constraint will be strictly non-binding for t ∈ [0, 3] whatever
the values of τ¯1 and τ¯2 that we can now set.
Set τ¯1 and τ¯2 to satisfy equation (25) and
∑
t≥0
1
(r∗)2t
Y2t
τ¯2t
+
1
(r∗)2t+1
a
Y2t+1
τ¯2t+1
− r0L0
τ¯0
=
1
1 + ρ
[∑
t≥0
1
(r∗)t
[
(1 + a)
Yt
τ¯t
]
+ r0
D0 − L0
τ¯0
]
.
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This condition states that in the associated open economy problem the ratio of intertem-
poral wealth of the cash-poor household and the cash-rich household in t = 0 equals
ρ.
Finally, suppose the central bank sets {B¯t+1, B¯∗t+1}t≥0 to target the interest rates
rt+1 = r
∗ τ¯t+1
τ¯t
. This is always possible as the central bank just needs to provide loans and
deposits at those rates and let agents choose their desired levels of loans and deposits.
The sequence {τ¯t}t≥0 satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 2. We can therefore look
for the equilibrium allocation of the associated open economy problem with zero tax. In
this associated problem, the endowments are constant and equal to y¯ for t ≥ 3, so the
borrowing constraints do not bind for t ≥ 4: λt+1 = 0,∀t ≥ 4.
Consider the candidate allocation {c¯Dt , c¯Lt }. It is the equilibrium allocation if the con-
straint does not bind either for t ∈ [0, 3], which is ensured by conditions (33). Therefore,
{c¯Dt , c¯Lt } is also an equilibrium allocation of the original problem. By definition, it is such
that consumptions are constant for each type of households and the ratio of consumptions
is equal cL0 /c
D
0 = ρ. Since consumption is constant for both households, it has to be that
the borrowing constraints never bind.
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Figure 1: Evolution of Chinese Current Account and Foreign Reserves Accumulation
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Figure 3: Optimal interest rate r − 1, in percentage points.
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